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SOCIAL INJUSTICE: DISTRIBUTIVE 
EGALITARIANISM, THE COMPLETE-LIFE VIEW, 
AND AGE DISCRIMINATION 
  
Richard Wagland 
 
There are “two different kinds of valuable equality” that might be distinguished 
within contemporary political thought.
1 The first kind is distributive in nature and 
specifies that justice requires benefits of a certain kind to be distributed equally. 
Equality of the second kind does not directly specify any particular distrib ution of 
benefits, but instead identifies a “social ideal” of “a society in which people regard 
and treat each other as equals.”
2 These two forms of equality can be labeled “dis-
tributive equality” and “social equality.” It is equality of the first kind that has been 
the focus of much contemporary liberal political philosophy over the last three 
decades since the publication of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice,
3 and it is that 
form of equality that is the focus of this chapter.  
It might be argued that egalitarians should pursue both conceptions of equali-
ty simultaneously, perhaps because one is just an alternative expression of the oth-
er. Nevertheless, one of the main claims of this chapter is that these conceptions do 
in fact conflict, at least when it comes to the treatment of older persons. The reason 
they conflict is that for a distributive egalitarian theory to be plausible it must e n-
sure that benefits are distributed diachronically between the separate co mplete 
lives of individuals, rather than at temporal synchronic moments within their lives. 
As we shall see, this in turn justifies age-discriminatory policies that are not com-
patible with the ideal of social equality. Rather they could only exist in a soci ety 
that does not regard and treat all individuals within it as equals. 
 
  
1. Distributive Equality and the Complete-Life View (CLV) 
   
Although many contemporary political philosophers would describe themselves as 
“egalitarian” so far as distributive justice is concerned, there are few who would 
suggest that equality is more important than other things such as providing incen- 
tives for the talented to be productive.
4 Non-instrumental egalitarianism, the view 
that equality is an intrinsic good, is subject to the intuitively implausible implic a-
tion that it would require us to prefer a society in which eve ryone was worse off 
but distribution of resources was more equal, to one in which everyone was better 
off, but inequality was greater. This is what is known as the “leveling down” ob-
jection.
5 Given the opportunity, a non -instrumental egalitarian would reduce the 
standard of living of everyone in order to create a more equal society. However, 
there are two possible alternative distributive principles that “egalitarian” thinkers 
might adopt instead of strict equality: prioritarianism, whereby the worst off in 
society are prioritized; and the principle of a social minimum (SM), which deter-
mines a level of well-being necessary for a decent life below which no-one should 
be allowed to fall. John Rawls, probably the most prominent of recent liberal egali-
tarian philosophers, is usually described as a prioritarian rather than a strict egali-
tarian because his “difference principle” permits inequality insofar as it benefits the 
least advantaged in society,
6 though it has also been argued that Rawls’s method-
ology would actually only justify a SM.
7 
Whether egalitarians favor strict equality or the priority principle, they must 
address a second distributive question. This question, described by Larry Temkin 
as  “the  unit  of  egalitarian  concern,”
8  involves  the  making  of  a  decision  about 
whether benefits should be distributed diachronically between the complete lives 
of separate persons or synchronically at temporal moments within those lives. This 
question is not relevant to the idea of the social minimum, as I will explain below, 
because its unit of concern is always synchronic. However, although rarely dis-
cussed within egalitarian theory, the issue of whether a synchronic or diachronic 
unit of egalitarian concern should be adopted is fundamental to distributive justice, 
because it determines exactly which individuals have claims of justice against the 
community. It is a question that Derek Parfit briefly addresses in his own discus-
sion of priority and strict equality, where he gives three possible answers to the 
question of to whom egalitarians should give priority: 
 
(1)  those who are worse off in their lives as a whole 
(2)  those who are worse off at a particular time 
(3)  those who have needs that are morally more urgent.
9 
 
Parfit notes that there is often a divergence between (1) and (2), but a conver-
gence between (2) and (3). So, someone who is now among the worst off may have 
been quite well off in the past, but if someone is worse off at a particular time then 
her needs are also likely to be morally more urgent. However, despite his i nsight, 
Parfit assumes for the purposes of his article that “there is no difference between  
those who are worse off at a time, and those who would be worse off in their lives 
as a whole.”
10 Parfit therefore assumes what has been referred to as the complete 
life view (CLV): that egalitarians should ensure benefits are distributed equally or 
relatively equally to the complete lives of separate individuals. 
Nevertheless, his assumption that those synchronically worse off are at the 
same time also diachronically worse off will often not hold. So the question re-
mains: do the synchronic interests of those who are worse off at a time have a mor-
al urgency that outweighs the moral importance of the CLV? This is precisely what 
a social minimum, otherwise known as the principle of sufficiency, does claim. 
The sufficiency principle logically appeals to the concept of urgency and of syn-
chronic need (so, to Parfit’s groups 2 and 3), and is not concerned that the shares of 
separate individuals should be either strictly or relatively equal over the course of 
people’s complete lives. Nevertheless, like Parfit, most egalitarians and prioritari-
ans either implicitly assume the CLV or else explicitly embrace it. Another exam-
ple is Thomas Nagel, who argues that “the subject of an egalitarian principle is not 
the distribution of particular rewards to individuals at some time, but the prospec-
tive quality of their lives as a whole, from birth to death.”
11 So, for distributive 
egalitarians the question of justice between the complete lives of separate individu-
als is viewed as a more fundamental issue than their temporal well-being relative to 
others at a particular time, and as we shall see below, the latter is often framed by 
the former.  
Dennis McKerlie defines the CLV as the normative principle “that different 
people’s share of resources, or welfare, should be equal when  we consider the 
amounts of those things that they receive over the complete course of their lives”.
12 
While this definition may be applicable to non-instrumental strict equality, Temkin 
recognizes that the view can also be applicable to the principle of priority, and he 
therefore defines the CLV as follows: 
    
The CLV: An egalitarian should be concerned about A’s being worse off than 
B to the extent, and only to the extent, that A’s life, taken as a complete 
whole, is worse off than B’s, taken as a complete whole.
13  
 
If egalitarian distributions are to be maintained over the complete lives of 
separate persons, then they may also justify significant inequalities between people 
at a certain time. This means that people can take turns to be rich and poor during 
their lives and yet be equal over their complete lives. It is in this way that a distrib-
utive egalitarianism based  upon the  CLV  would also condone discrimination 
against older individuals. Geoffrey Cupit, for example, has noted that “the alleged 
injustice of age discrimination presents a puzzle,” because the “standard argument  
against discrimination—the argument from equalizing benefits—seems not to ap-
ply.”
14 It does not apply because equalizing benefits over the complete lives of 
separate persons might actually justify age discrimination rather than challenge it. 
It does this for the obvious fact that nowadays most of us have a turn to be old, 
and, by taking turns to be well-off or badly off, temporal or synchronic inequalities 
will even out over the course of people’s lives. So, Cupit argues that to say some-
thing is wrong with age discrimination is to say that there is something wrong with 
taking turns. If it is fair that we should take turns to be rich and poor at different 
parts of our lives, why would it not also be fair for those periods of affluence and 
relative poverty to coincide respectively with youth and old age? 
The intuition that discrimination against the old might be justifiable arises 
from the idea that, in order for each of us to have as good a complete life as possi-
ble, benefits should be distributed in such a way that allows more to be consumed 
during the early part of a life when people are advancing their educational and em-
ployment opportunities and raising young families. In contrast, it might be thought 
that few new long-term projects can be pursued in old age, or indeed that older 
people would not wish to pursue them, and there consequently seems little point in 
saving much for that synchronic period of life. Indeed, it is quite possible we will 
not live to see it anyway. As we shall see below, it might be entirely rational for 
people to discriminate against their own future older selves. Age discrimination 
may be said to be fair because it treats everyone the same over their complete lives, 
and it may be in everyone’s interests because it allows the most efficient use of 
people’s equal diachronic shares of benefits. 
The implications of the CLV are particularly important in light of the genera-
tional equity debate which has been fuelled by organizations like Americans for 
Age Equity (AGE) over the last couple of decades. It has been claimed by some 
that those who are currently old are now enjoying more than their fair share of 
benefits.
15 As a social group the old are perceived to be better off not just than pre-
vious generations of the old, and not just better off than the younger age -groups of 
today, but more importantly to be in addition better off than the next generation of 
the old can hope to be. If such is the case then the CLV is not currently being r e-
spected. Indeed, if the CLV is morally sound then it would require society to r e-
strict the benefits enjoyed by the current old and redistribute those bene fits to 
younger age groups. Moreover, the strict egalitarian version of the CLV would go 
further than the advocates of generational equity in that it would require this r e-
striction of benefits from the old even if those benefits could not be redistributed to 
the  young.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  greater  complete  life  equality  would  be 
achieved simply by that restriction. As we shall see below, however, distributive 
egalitarianism and the CLV only justify ageist public policies when they are linked  
to a prudential analogy (PA). At the same time, however, a PA is necessary in or-
der for a distributive egalitarian theory, based upon the CLV, to provide plausible 
principles of justice on a societal scale.  
 
 
2. The CLV and Personal Responsibility 
 
There is of course a very good reason for egalitarian liberals to think it necessary to 
embrace an exclusive concern for the CLV, which is that it requires individuals to 
be personally responsible for the success of their own lives. If benefits are distrib-
uted on a diachronic basis then individuals must save and invest them wisely in 
order to ensure a good standard of living throughout their lives. An equal share of a 
particular benefit, which individuals can then freely dispose of as they see fit, will 
protect their equal liberty. In this way individuals are assured material autonomy 
from both other citizens and the state, and they have the equal opportunity to pur-
sue their particular conception of the good. Synchronic distributions, on the other 
hand, would threaten that equal liberty and opportunity, and may seem to reward 
free riders. If individuals could expect to receive a new share of benefits at each 
temporal stage of their lives there would be no reason for them to be responsible. 
They might squander those benefits with impunity. This would have implications 
for the economic stability of the state, and would also be unfair to those who have 
been responsible with their share of goods. Responsible citizens would repeatedly 
find themselves required to redistribute some of that share to prevent the destitu-
tion of the imprudent. So, because the CLV obviously prevents free riding, any 
challenge to it would need at the same time to address this problem of free riding 
in order to claim any moral superiority.  
Distributive egalitarians, or what Elizabeth Anderson has described as luck 
egalitarians,
 16 also make a moral distinction between brute luck on the one hand, 
which relates to our unchosen circumstances, and option luck on the other, which 
relates to personal choice. Although Anderson identifies various distributive ver-
sions of luck egalitarianism, including “equality of resources,”
17 “equal access to 
advantage,”
18 “equal opportunity for welfare,”
19 and “equality of fortune,”
20 the 
fundamental principle underlying each variant is a common conception of fairness. 
That  conception  requires  that  society  should  compensate  individuals  for  disad-
vantages for which they are not responsible, but require them to bear the full costs 
of the adverse consequences of their choices. That is to say, individuals are held 
personally responsible for the success of their lives. It seems legitimate to do this 
because each individual then has an equal opportunity to make their life a success. 
As Gerry Cohen points out, by giving a central role to the ideas of personal respon- 
sibility and choice in this way, egalitarians can sidestep one of the most compelling 
criticisms  from  the  anti-egalitarian  right:  the  criticism  that  egalitarians  wish  to 
equalize the outcomes for all persons irrespective of how much effort or personal 
responsibility they display.
21 
So, distributive luck egalitarianism is based upon two premises: first, that di-
achronic equality is viewed as the fairest form of distribution; and second, that the 
cut between choice and circumstance is mo rally important because it maintains 
diachronic equality between separate persons. It also has the effect of pr omoting 
personal responsibility. The CLV is integral to distributive egalitarianism, because 
only by giving exclusive concern to the diachronic e quality between individuals 
can it give full expression to these two premises.  
 
 
3. What Benefits Should be Distributed Over a Complete Life? 
 
A further issue for distributive egalitarians is to determine what should comprise 
the benefits that are to be distributed over a complete life.
22 This issue refers to the 
debate between distributive egalitarians as to what standard of interpersonal co m-
parison should be used to identify those individuals who are worse off than others, 
or how we should operate what Cohen has termed the “currency of egalitarian jus-
tice.”
23 Because distributive egalitarians are concerned that individuals should have 
the opportunity to pursue their own conceptions of the good in their own ways, 
they have tended to embrace currencies such as welfare and resources (or a combi-
nation), which are seen either as subjective or as necessary conditions for pursuing 
any  conception  of  the  good,  instead  of  trying  to  compile  an  objective  list  of 
“goods” for interpersonal comparison.
24 (“Objective list” theorists hold that some 
goods are intrinsically good or bad irrespective of whether they are desired by in-
dividuals, and consequently can be criticized as being “perfectionist” or “paternal-
ist.”) The two metrics of welfare and resources differ in many details that cannot 
be adequately covered here, and for that reason I will mention only the main dis-
tinctions between them, and those that have direct implications for the CLV.  
Welfare is here understood as the satisfaction of an individual’s informed de-
sires. Resources, or the means to achieve our ends, take the form of impersonal 
goods and money. Welfare egalitarians argue that people only value resources for 
the welfare they bring, and that resources are merely instrumental goods.
25 Howev-
er, there are many c riticisms of the welfare metric. There are intense practical 
problems in measuring how much welfare each individual in a society is getting, 
and in quantitatively or even qualitatively co mparing one person’s happiness, or 
desire-satisfaction, with that of others. This would be exacerbated if welfare had to  
be equalized between the complete lives of separate individuals. The fact that there 
is some degree of mental and physical decline involved with ageing means that the 
well-being of people is likely to naturally diminish as people get older. Conse-
quently, older people may require greater resources in order to achieve the same 
level of welfare as younger people. The changing of a person’s conversion ratio of 
resources into welfare as we age also means that the equality-of-welfare metric 
would need to find a way of simultaneously comparing the interpersonal welfare 
between people who are young, middle-aged, and old. However, this process of 
measuring the respective welfare of people in society would be further complicated 
because the relative decline that each older individual experiences will proceed at 
different rates. 
Equality of resources,  by contrast,  would as an administrative task be  far 
simpler to establish and maintain than equality of welfare. Moreover, the use of 
what might be called a prudential analogy (PA) would allow resources to be dis-
tributed justly across lives as  well as between them. The PA  is a  hypothetical 
thought experiment that requires us to imagine the way in which a rational individ-
ual would invest her equal share of complete life resources to pay for insurance 
against the likely eventuality that she would suffer disability, disease, or accident. 
This hypothetical insurance scheme would then dictate what levels of resources 
should be distributed over time to those in society who suffer from such health 
problems.  
Another criticism of the welfare metric is the dilemma it seems to face be-
tween  expensive  and  cheap  tastes.  The  criticism  is  that,  since  individuals  with 
more expensive tastes require more resources to reach the same level of preference 
satisfaction as others, welfarism will require people who have cheaper tastes to 
have fewer resources directed toward them,
26 so that people who have more control 
over their desires will be required to finance those who are more extravagant. Wel-
farists will reply that an individual may have e xpensive tastes for which they are 
not responsible, such as the desire for mobility amongst the disabled.
27 They have 
argued that resource egalitarians are unable to distinguish between the involuntary 
expensive tastes of the disabled, and the extravagant expensive tastes for which an 
individual should be held responsible, such as  a preference for  drinking lots of 
Champagne.
28  
Resource egalitarians, such as  Ronald  Dworkin,  argue that the important 
moral  difference  between  an  individual’s  expensive  voluntary  and  involuntary 
tastes can be captured with the distinction between her share of “impersonal” re-
sources, such as divisible goods and money, and “personal” resources, such as her 
intelligence, skills, and abilities. A just distribution of personal goods can be de-
termined within a resource metric by allowing individuals the freedom to use their  
equal purchasing power to secure the goods for their preferred conception of the 
good in a free and competitive market. So, if an individual has tastes that are ex-
pensive to satisfy, but for which she is responsible, she may purchase these with 
her equal purchasing power. If on the other hand that person is disabled, and so has 
an involuntary expensive taste for mobility, then she is lacking a personal good 
enjoyed by the able-bodied. A lack of such personal goods can be compensated for 
using the same hypothetical insurance analogy outlined above. Both Dworkin and 
Norman Daniels combine the CLV with a PA in order to secure justice across the 
lives of individuals, and so in effect between age groups. The following two sec-
tions briefly critique the PAs of these two egalitarians. 
 
 
4. Ronald Dworkin’s Prudential Analogy 
 
As a resource egalitarian, Dworkin makes a distinction between the impersonal and 
personal resources that individuals enjoy, and he utilizes what he calls an “envy 
test” to determine what justice requires. The envy test requires that each person in 
a just society be satisfied with the level of both personal and impersonal resources 
they end up with, but also that each person should take responsibility for how her 
tastes are satisfied. A hypothetical auction divides all divisible goods into separate 
lots and bundles, and each individual can then bid for those goods with an equal 
initial purchasing power. Because everyone has equal purchasing power, the par-
ticular bundles of goods they end up with will reflect their level of desire for those 
goods, so that the outcome of the auction is one that satisfies the envy test, because 
no-one would prefer anyone else’s bundle to their own.  
However,  Dworkin  wishes  to  maintain  the  distinction  between  personal 
choice and unchosen circumstances, and to ensure that his principles of justice are 
therefore endowment-insensitive. We are not responsible for our abundance or lack 
of natural talents, or for any natural disability: it is a matter of brute luck. If a dis-
tribution is to be endowment-insensitive, a society is required to compensate each 
individual for shortfalls in their personal resources with a greater level of imper-
sonal  resources.  To  do  this  Dworkin  posits  a  hypothetical  insurance  market  in 
which he asks us to think about how much we would insure against being born 
with  handicaps  and  other  natural  disadvantages,  on  the  assumption  that  all  are 
equally likely to suffer from that bad brute luck. The distributive pattern justified 
by this ideal-world hypothetical thought experiment would then be replicated in the 
real world of practice by appropriately arranging taxation and public expenditure 
policies. 
  
The CLV is explicitly embraced within Dworkin’s PA. He insists that “we 
must apply the envy test diachronically”
29 in order that no-one should envy the 
occupation and bundle of resources at the disposal of anyone else over time, even 
though it is possible that someone may envy another’s bundle at a particular time. 
As Dworkin argues: 
 
If we look for envy at particular points in time, then each envies [Person B’s] 
resources at the end of the year, and the division is therefore not equal. But if 
we look at envy differently, as a matter of resources over an entire life, and 
we include a person’s occupation as part of the bundle of goods, then no-one 
envies [Person B’s] bundle, and the distribution cannot be said to be unequal 
on that account.
30  
 
Dworkin therefore seeks a just distribution of society’s goods to the temporal stag-
es of individual lives by combining the CLV with a PA. Some people will wish to 
work hard and accumulate their resources, while others will wish to enjoy more 
leisure and consequently fewer resources. For this reason it is viewed as fair to 
suggest that in order for someone to legitimately envy the bundle of resources of 
another she would also have to envy the level of hard work that the other person 
had done in order to accumulate those resources. Thus, while person A might envy 
Person B’s bundle of goods a year after an initial distribution, she could not envy 
Person B’s complete life and all the work he has had to do in order to accumulate 
his final complete life share.   
Dworkin applies his hypothetical insurance model to the issue of justice in 
the distribution of healthcare.
31 After equalizing resources along the lines of the 
CLV, prudential agents are asked whether they would buy in to an insurance plan 
that would guarantee certain medical treatments and diagnostic procedures but 
would deny others. Dworkin tries to determine what we would  rationally spend on 
healthcare in competition with the other goods we may wish to purchase, assuming 
that each person’s purchasing power is equal and finite. The idea that shares should 
be equal and finite means we can measure the cost of any preference we have for 
one good in terms of the absence of another good of similar value. If individuals 
would purchase certain healthcare goods (emergency medical treatment) and not 
others (life-extending treatment when very old), then society should emulate those 
hypothetical  decisions  in  order  to  provide  a  just  distribution  of  healthcare  re-
sources. Thus, the central idea of Dworkin’s PA is that we should aim in practice 
to  make  collective,  social  decisions  about  the  quantity  and  distribution  of 
healthcare so as to match, as closely as possible, the decisions that people in the 
community would make for themselves in the appropriate conditions.  
The first of these conditions is, as already outlined above, that the economic 
system of society should provide a “fair equality” in the distribution of resources, 
and Dworkin argues that only by doing so can we treat all citizens with equal re-
spect and concern. The second condition involves individuals having full aware-
ness of the value, cost, and side effects of all medical procedures. The third condi-
tion is a type of Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” that hides individual rational deliber-
ators from knowledge of their own probability of contracting any disease or be-
coming victim to any kind of accident or violent incident. If we could keep as close 
to these conditions as is practically possible, then the decision that people in the 
community  would  have  made  for  themselves  would  be  the  ones  that  the  state 
should emulate on a societal basis. 
This, then, is the application of the insurance analogy to the problem of jus-
tice of healthcare distribution. However, what Dworkin deems to be just are the 
decisions that people would make for themselves “if they were looking from youth 
down the course of their lives and trying to decide what risks were worth running 
in return for not running other kinds of risk.”
32 This phrase “looking from youth 
down the course of their lives” leaves Dworkin’s use of prudence open to the criti-
cism that it is ageist. The conditions of Dworkin’s PA might be ageist because they 
are based upon the choices that a young person would make, whilst aware of her 
current age and goals, and the result of that choice will consequently be biased in 
favor of the young and against the old.
33 We might argue that this represents a 
“tyranny of youth,” because the decisions that the younger person makes will limit 
the opportunities of the same person when they become older. 
What, then, does Dworkin believe would be the result of this insurance anal-
ogy? He believes that almost no-one would purchase insurance that would provide 
life-saving treatment once they had fallen into a permanent vegetative state (PVS), 
and no-one would purchase insurance for expensive medical treatment after they 
had entered the later stages of Alzheimer’s disease. Most contentious of all, per-
haps,  few  would  insure  for  the  provision  of  “heroic  medical  intervention”  that 
would keep them alive for an additional four or five months or “technology whose 
main results benefit people in relatively old age.”
34 The reason that people would 
not so invest is that they could better spend those premiums on training, experi-
ence, culture, or investment while they were younger. Although Dworkin acknowl-
edges that many people want to remain alive as long as possible, provided they 
remain conscious, alert, and relatively free of pain, he nevertheless makes the fol-
lowing claim: 
 
My point is … that they would not want those additional months at the cost of 
the sacrifices in their earlier, vigorous life that would be necessary if they had  
to make that choice. They would think the money better spent, earlier, on job-
training or education or investment or on something else that would benefit 
their lives as a whole more than just taking on a few months of very limited 
life at the end.
35 
 
What this represents, in addition to a tyranny of  youth, is a conflict between 
the synchronic and diachronic interests of a person. The synchronic interests of the 
older person is to live a few more months, or to undergo certain beneficial trea t-
ments, while the diachronic interests of the person is perhaps that the resources be 
diverted from financing these later benefits and  used to provide benefits for the 
younger self. If we followed Dworkin’s reasoning it would mean harming the syn-
chronic interests of our own later selves by allowing the synchronic interests of our 
younger selves, or what we at any temporal point perceive to be our diachronic 
interests, to dictate the distribution of a finite share of resources over a complete 
life. But one might object that there is surely more to what justice requires than the 
way that prudent people in their youth would determine to allocate a finite set of 
resources “down the course of their lives.” It is plausible to imagine a doctor at a 
patient’s bedside giving the following homily: 
 
I’m sorry Mrs Smith, but I’m afraid we are going to deny you the medical 
treatment that would give you five more months of life. The reason we deny 
you this is because, although you think you want those months of life now, if 
you were a rational twenty year old deciding how to spend your finite share 
of goods down the course of your life, you would elect to spend the money 
that would have paid for this treatment on a youthful culture trip to Italy in-
stead.  
 
It is possible that Mrs Smith would acknowledge the truth of the doctor’s words 
and accept that she must die, but it is not obvious that she would. 
 
 
5. Norman Daniels’s Prudential Analogy 
 
Norman Daniels is another egalitarian liberal who has combined the CLV with a 
conception of the PA in order to determine the just distribution of goods such as 
healthcare and income support. There are two assumptions that condition the cir-
cumstances in which prudential agents deliberate within Daniels’s PA: the standard 
theory of a maximizing rationality, and the Requirement of Equal Concern.
36 The 
first of these, the assumption of a maximizing rationality, is based upon the central  
claim of the classical theory of individual rationality, described by Parfit as the 
Self-Interest Theory.
37 The central claim is that for each person, there is one s u-
premely rational ultimate aim: that his life go, for him, as well as possible. This 
central aim involves further claims, the most significant for our purposes being that 
what it would be rational for anyone to do is what  will bring him the greatest ex-
pected benefit.
38 Together these two principles are what we can refer to as the max-
imizing of rationality. Daniels notes that in his conception of the PA, which he 
describes as the Prudential Lifetime Account (PLA), the greates t expected benefit 
is to be aggregated over a complete life.
39 That is to say, the prudent deliberators 
behind Daniels’s version of the veil of ignorance will choose the intrapersonal dis-
tribution that promises to maximize the greatest expected diachronic benefit. This 
is important because the intrapersonal distribution that brings about the greatest 
diachronic benefit may well be that which also creates significant negative benefit 
at certain synchronic temporal periods. 
The second assumption that conditions Daniels’s PA, and the decision proce-
dure it involves, is what Parfit has referred to as the Requirement of Equal Con-
cern: that a rational person should be equally concerned about all the parts of her 
own future.
40 This might also be called the age -neutrality principle because it as-
sumes an attitude of mor al neutrality toward the intrinsic worth of the different 
ages of a life. Such an impartial concern would mean that “a smaller present good 
is not to be preferred to a greater future good.”
41 We must therefore assume that the 
prudent deliberator is concerned about the diachronic well-being she will enjoy 
over her complete life, and is not more concerned with the success of one part of 
that life than with other parts. Given these assumptions, Daniels argues, resources 
should then be distributed between people of different ages in the way that pruden-
tial agents would divide them over the corresponding temporal stages of a single 
life. Daniels believes that once these two conditions of the PA have been secured 
regarding the decision procedure, then “[w]hatever is prudent from this perspective 
constitutes what is just.”
42 
So, Daniels assumes for the purpose of his theory that intrapersonal justice is 
“framed” by the issue of interpersonal justice, and therefore, certain inequalities 
that egalitarians might otherwise permit in order to  maximize the overall social 
product are not necessary. Therefore, “[i]nequalities in income levels between the 
stages of life work only as a zero-sum game, making one period of life better off at 
the expense of another period of life.”
43 As a consequence, Daniels believes that 
“the prudent course of action would be to allocate resources in such a way that 
income … would remain roughly equal over the lifespan.”
44 If an individual could 
know that his plan of life contained preferences which at all stages of life would 
make an unequal distribution preferable, then an unequal intrapersonal distribution  
would be a better one for that individual. This is what Dworkin’s PA allows, but 
Daniels’s does not. The reason that Daniels hides this knowledge from prudential 
deliberators behind his veil of ignorance is that, as he acknowledges, “we revise 
plans of life, often in fundamental ways, as we age.”
45 It is this fact of uncertainty 
that leads Daniels to believe the Income Preservation Principle (IPP) would be 
chosen: a principle that ensured people sufficient resources at each stage of their 
lives to pursue whatever plan of life they may have at each particular stage. 
However, if we accept the CLV, the standard assumption of a maximizing ra-
tionality of self-interest, and the conditions of Daniels’s PA, it is still arguable that 
rational deliberators would not in fact decide upon the IPP. In other words, they 
would not distribute their finite share of resources “roughly equally” across a life. 
In fact it is possible, as McKerlie has argued, that in order to maximize expected 
diachronic benefit over a complete life, it may be necessary to allocate dispropor-
tionate shares between younger and older selves, and it is consequently quite pos-
sible that prudence “would treat the very old harshly.”
46 
McKerlie’s claim is that, given the goal of maximizing diachronic well-being, 
people might rationally follow the classical theory of practical reasoning and yet 
favor a life that did in fact involve synchronic inequalities, even if by doing so they 
did not increase the total complete life benefits they could enjoy. Maximal dia-
chronic well-being might require unequal consumption throughout a life. Daniels 
does in fact point to this possibility himself. He claims some “qualifications” are 
necessary to the IPP and that income distribution must be adjusted if it is to count 
as a measure of well-being at different points in the lifespan, because what we are 
really interested in is a person’s “standard of living.” But equal income levels at 
different stages of life may not represent equal standards of living. The example he 
uses is income spent on raising children, including advancing their educational 
opportunities. This investment is at least in part inelastic, and if it represents a “du-
rable good” that produces benefits to parents over their complete lifespan, then we 
should  readjust  the  post-retirement  income  levels  of  the  parents  by  subtracting 
some portion of income to be spent on their children.
47 If we violate the IPP in the 
way Daniels himself suggests, then this may not be enough to create or justify age-
discriminatory policies. But if we combine it with other likely reasons for detrac t-
ing from the IPP, then the aggregated consequences may result in a significant re-
striction of benefits from the old. 
What then are the other possible reasons that prudential deliberators would 
fail to preserve sufficient resources for their old age   as the IPP suggests they 
would? First, individuals behind the veil of ignorance do not know how long they 
personally will live, although they do know the average life expectancy one can 
expect to enjoy within their society. If that average is something like seventy-five,  
then they know that although they can expect to reach that age they are far less 
likely to reach eighty-five, and quite unlikely to make ninety-five. It must seem at 
least plausible then that rational deliberators, thinking about their own lives, would 
not save very much for the slim possibility that they might live that long. While it 
might be prudent to save resources for great age it certainly does not seem impru-
dent to decide not to save the same “roughly equal” share of income at that life 
stage as every other. To do so would be to risk wasting a significant share of your 
complete life resources. As McKerlie points out, this consideration does not violate 
the age-neutrality principle because it is not necessary to assume that the older life 
segments are of less intrinsic value than any other segment of a person’s life.
48 An 
age-neutrality principle by itself does not therefore prevent age discrimination. For 
the very old to be neglected it is only necessary to acknowledge that the prudential 
deliberators, behind a veil of ignorance, would know that they are very unlikely to 
live long enough to enjoy any benefits set aside for the very old age group. 
A second reason that prudential deliberators may not choose the IPP is that 
people would not necessarily find it imprudent to consume  a greater share of their 
finite resources while young. As we have seen, Daniels stipulates that the budget to 
be distributed intrapersonally has already been framed by interpersonal justice, and 
that therefore prudential deliberators could not seek to expa nd their lifetime share 
by allocating it in certain ways, perhaps by investing in their human capital while 
young. Daniels believes that because such a disproportionate youthful alloc ation 
would not increase  your  complete life share of resources ,  consequently people 
would not distribute it in that way. However, it does not seem irrational to co n-
sume more of your resources while young, either in education or developing your-
self in other ways,  even if it does not increase your complete life earning power. 
For  example,  education,  cultural  experience,  and  travel  may  increase  your  dia-
chronic well-being for psychological rather than merely materialistic reasons, and 
we might invest in them even if by doing so we simultaneously reduced our life-
time shares. As we saw in the last section, Dworkin is quite explicit that such con-
siderations would justify restricting resources from the very old. Daniels, on the 
other hand, seems to deny that such justifications would be considered. 
A third criticism, again outlined by McKerlie, is a consequence of the calcu-
lations that would be inherent in maximizing rationality: that “prudence will only 
save for old age if the sacrifice that such saving requires early in life is less than 
the eventual gain when the resources are used during old age.”
49 It is an unfortu-
nate fact that with the onset of old age, our physical and mental powers usually 
begin to decline and this makes it more difficult to use our resources to improve 
our lives. It is also increasingly unlikely that we would expect to want to “radically 
revise” our conceptions of the good life as we grow older. One reason for this  
might be that we would simply lack the energy and motivation. Another reason is 
anticipated by Daniels himself in a footnote in which he acknowledges that ration-
ally prudent individuals may well discount their later years from the consideration 
of the fecundity of the benefits they can expect from them, or that fewer opportuni-
ties exist for further personal development when we are older. Thus, Daniels rec-
ognizes that: 
 
If this is so, then, other things being equal, a later year is worth less than an 
earlier  one  because  whatever  opportunities  for  generating  further  benefits 
from activities pursued in a later year are less than those generated at an earli-
er year.
50 
 
Again, however, it is not necessary that by  favoring earlier years in this way 
we would violate the age-neutrality principle. It would simply not be a prudential 
calculation to invest as much in to later temporal periods of our lives as Daniels’s 
IPP would suggest, given the overall goal of maximizing the greatest diachronic 
benefit over a complete life. 
These considerations suggest that it is quite plausible that given the condi-
tions of Daniels’s PA, combined with his commitment to the CLV and maximizing 
rationality, that prudential deliberators would not choose his IPP. Indeed, rather 
than saving a roughly equal share of income for each stage of life, it is quite plau-
sible that the later stages will be neglected to some extent. Moreover, while each of 
these considerations might lead to only a small deviation from the IPP, taken to-
gether they may well collectively lead to justifying a certain amount of age dis-
crimination. One of Daniels’s fundamental assumptions is that prudence should 
dictate justice, but if it is not imprudent to leave little for your own very old age, it 
does not follow that justice does not require society to provide a sufficient income 
for people who live to the age of ninety-five and beyond. This consideration points 
to the strong possibility that justice cannot simply be reduced to the prudent deci-
sions that individuals would make about their own lives, irrespective of whether 
they would, in a hypothetical situation involving an informational constraint, have 
made provision themselves. 
 
 
6. A Return to Social Equality 
 
We have seen that there are good reasons for distributive egalitarians to accept the 
CLV, both because it rewards personal responsibility and maintains “fairness” be-
tween separate persons. We have also seen that for a distributive egalitarian theory  
to provide plausible principles of justice appropriate for societies, rather than just 
for individuals, the CLV requires the employment of a PA. Different thinkers such 
as Dworkin and Daniels have deployed different conceptions of the PA, but those 
conceptions nevertheless involve prudential agents deliberating behind a more or 
less extensive veil of ignorance, which is designed to ensure that the principles of 
justice decided upon are disinterested and unbiased. Nevertheless, we have also 
seen that, even by the conditions of these PAs, the types of policies they would 
suggest for society might treat the old quite harshly. 
McKerlie points out that the combination of the CLV and the PA is reduc-
tionist in several ways. It supposes that questions of synchronic distribution be-
tween individuals at a time can be reduced to the question of diachronic lifetime 
distributions. It supposes that interpersonal justice can be reduced to a question of 
intrapersonal justice. Finally, it supposes that questions about justice can be re-
duced to a question concerning individual prudence.
51 The first two criticisms refer 
to the CLV, the third to the PLA. But the use of prudence within the PLA would 
have no meaning if there were not lifetime sh ares to prudentially distribute across 
your life. Contrary to Daniels’s defense of the PLA, McKerlie argues that the ap-
peal to prudence is “a kind of trick,” and that there are real conflicts between the 
claims of the young and the old that are “neither transcended nor plausibly re-
solved” by assuming the CLV and reducing justice to prudence.
52 As we have seen 
in the previous sections, the CLV and PA combination has implications that are 
intuitively unacceptable.  
The CLV and the PA are integral to distributive “luck” egalitarianism, which 
remains the dominant position within contemporary political philosophy. Never-
theless, as Samuel Scheffler points out, a “project of critical examination” of that 
philosophical position has been initiated by Anderson and others.
53 This project 
questions the distributive egalitarian assumption that egalitarians should focus so 
extensively on the distribution of divisible goods because it argues that there is 
something else more fundamental to egalitarianism than simple distribut ion, for 
example the social relationships between citizens. This leads us to  consider the 
second kind of “valuable equality” mentioned in my introduction, that of a social 
ideal in which people regard and treat each other as equals. That equal distribution 
is not the only important, or even the most important, element of egalitarianism is 
recognized by Cohen when he acknowledges that “it seems quite unclear that a 
state which forthrightly refuses to pursue a norm of strict distributive equality ipso 
facto shows failure to treat its subjects with equal respect and concern.”
54 Never-
theless, as we have seen above, the state’s pursuit of equality or priority over a 
complete life may well lead to a society that fails to treat its subjects with equal 
concern and respect.   
David Miller believes that the ideal of social equality is more deeply embed-
ded in the contemporary moral consciousness,
55 and, as Timothy Scanlon notes, 
“the ideal of a society in which people all regard one another as equals … has 
played a more important role in radical egalitarian thinking than the idea of distrib-
utive justice which dominates much discussion in our time.”
56 Indeed, both Ander-
son and Scheffler claim that distributive egalitarianism is not what egalitarian po-
litical movements have historically sought to achieve. Instead, they have pursued 
the social and political ideal of equal social relations between citizens. This is as 
true for anti-sexists and anti-racists as it is for those who challenge the prejudices 
and inequalities that disadvantage older people, and it is this social form of equali-
ty to which anti-ageists should appeal.  
A social equality of this kind would have no need for a commitment to the 
CLV, a PA, or the age discrimination they may justify. Instead, it would be con-
cerned only that relations between citizens remain equal. Integral to such a concern 
would be the view that the moral force of synchronic interests is greater than any 
concern for diachronic equality. Thus, in Parfit’s terms, as far as the distribution of 
divisible goods is concerned both those who are worse off at a time, and those 
whose needs are morally more urgent, would be given priority over those who 
were worse off in their lives as a whole (provided the latter were not currently in 
either of the two former categories). This means that social equality would, at the 
very  least,  ensure  something  like  the  sufficiency  principle.  However,  as  noted 
above, if we reject the CLV and distribute at least some benefits on a synchronic 
basis we are faced with the problem of the free rider, and the question of how we 
ensure that people continue to be personally responsible for the success of their 
lives. Nevertheless, the following chapter discusses another defense of ageism, the 
fair innings argument (FIA), which also neglects the importance of the personal 
responsibility of individuals, although this has not diminished its influence within 
rationing decisions. 
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